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THE	 DAO	 OF	 POLITICS:	 LI	 (RITUALS/RITES)	 AND	
LAWS	 AS	 PRAGMATIC	TOOLS	 OF	 GOVERNMENT
Sor-hoon Tan
Philosophy	Department,	National	University	of	Singapore
American	philosopher	John	Dewey	spent	more	than	two	years	in	China	(1919–1921).	
During	and	after	his	visit,	he	wrote	some	fairly	perceptive	and	insightful	c	ommentaries	
on	China.	These	were	published	in	periodicals	such	as	the	New Republic, Asia,	and	
the	China Review,	and	sometimes	in	newspapers	such	as	the	Baltimore Sun.	How-
ever,	 there	 is	 hardly	 any	 discussion	 of	 Chinese	 philosophy	 in	 Dewey’s	 published	
works	or	even	his	papers	and	correspondence.	Among	his	rare	mentions	of	Chinese	
philosophy	was	an	article	published	 in	1922,	 “As	 the	Chinese	Think,”	which	dis-
cussed	the	teachings	of	Lao	Zi	and	Confucius	(M13	:	217–27).1	This	was	an	attempt	to	
improve	Western	(or	at	least	American)	understanding	of	Chinese	attitudes	and	ac-
tions	in	international	negotiations	and	business.	It	describes	the	influence	of	Confu-
cianism	and	Daoism	as	merging	“to	create	a	definite	contempt	for	politics	and	an	
aversion	to	government	as	the	West	understands	the	term”	(M13	:	225).	It	goes	on	to	
describe	the	Chinese	polity	in	these	words:
The	emperor	did	not	govern.	He	ruled	by	not	governing,	by	not	interfering	with	the	real	
government,	the	customs	of	the	people,	which	were	so	immemorial	and	so	interwoven	
with	agriculture,	with	the	operations	of	nature	that	they	themselves	were	like	the	work-
ings	of	nature.	(M13	:	225)
A	later	work,	The Public and its Problems,	contrasts	“the	Orient”	with	Western	soci-
ety,	in	which	the	public	is	capable	of	being	organized	into	a	state	between	the	“too	
close	and	intimate”	and	“the	too	remote	and	disconnected”	(L2	:	260).	In	“the	Ori-
ent,”
Politics	is	not	a	branch	of	morals;	it	is	submerged	in	morals.	All	virtues	are	summed	up	in	
filial	piety.	Wrongdoing	is	culpable	because	it	reflects	upon	one’s	ancestry	and	kin.	Offi-
cials	 are	 known	 but	 only	 to	 be	 shunned.	To	 submit	 a	 dispute	 to	 them	 is	 a	 disgrace.	
(L2	:	262)
Dewey	considered	it	a	common	feature	of	early	societies,	and	not	just	of	the	Ori-
ent,	that	customs	rather	than	laws	had	been	the	main	means	of	achieving	and	main-
taining	 social	 order	 and	 dealing	 with	 crises	 (L2	:	262;	 M7	:	399).	As	 a	 principle	 of	
organization	(M6	:	413),	customs	consist	of	the	various	ways	in	which	key	relation-
ships	in	a	society	are	regulated	(L7	:	50).	They	are	“approved	ways	of	acting,	common	
to	a	group,	and	handed	down	 from	generation	 to	generation”	 (M5	:	54),	 including	
language,	polite	manners,	social	conventions,	and	a	large	part	of	the	content	of	mo-
rality.	Dewey	cited	China	as	an	example	of	a	civilized	society	in	which	the	materials	
and	ideals	of	education	derive	almost	entirely	from	customs	(M6	:	413).
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What	Dewey	referred	 to	as	China’s	“customs”	overlap	significantly	with	what	
Confucians	call	li	禮,	translated	as	“rites”	or	“rituals,”	among	several	possibilities.2	
According	to	Dewey,	ritual	is	the	“great	positive	agent”	of	customs	and	“works	by	
forming	habits,	and	operates	through	associations	formed	by	actually	doing	certain	
acts,	usually	under	conditions	which	appeal	to	the	emotions”	(M5	:	58).	Dewey	used	
“ritual”	 mostly	 in	 connection	 with	 religion	 and	 occasionally	 in	 connection	 with	
primitive	society.	Although	the	Chinese	li	禮	also	has	a	religious	origin,	Confucian	li	
is	much	broader	and	more	akin	to	“custom”	in	Dewey’s	usage:
Do	not	look	unless	it	is	in	accordance	with	the	rites	[li];	do	not	listen	unless	it	is	in	ac-
cordance	with	the	rites;	do	not	speak	unless	it	is	in	accordance	with	the	rites;	do	not	move	
unless	it	is	in	accordance	with	the	rites.	(Analects	12.1)3
Examples	of	li	in	the	Analects	include	norms	regulating	and	distinguishing	various	
important	 relationships,	 facilitating	 social	 interaction,	 and	 “Of	 the	 things	 brought	
about	by	the	rites	[li],	harmony	is	the	most	valuable”	(Analects	12.1).	Confucian	li,	
like	Dewey’s	customs,	are	also	means	of	dealing	with	the	crises	of	life	such	as	war	
and	death,	 and	of	 celebrating	 important	 events	 such	as	birth	 and	coming	of	 age.	
Dewey’s	contrast	of	customs	as	the	real	government	in	China	and	the	typical	Chinese	
disparagement	of	punishments	and	litigation	implicitly	refers	to	the	traditional	op-
position	in	Chinese	thought	between	li	禮	and	fa	法	(laws)	as	tools	of	government.
I	 shall	 examine	 the	opposition	between	 li	 and	 fa	 through	an	engagement	be-
tween	Confucianism	and	Dewey’s	pragmatism.4	Does	this	opposition	enlighten	or	
obscure	our	understanding	of	Chinese	political	philosophy?	What	are	its	inadequa-
cies?	Could	Deweyan	pragmatists	learn	something	from	its	strengths?
China’s “Society without Litigation”
While	law	and	legal	language	dominate	the	way	Americans	think	of	themselves	and	
their	society,	the	Chinese	have	always	prided	themselves	on	their	“kingdom	of	rituals	
and	ceremonies”	(liyi zhi bang	禮儀之邦).5	Chinese	society	has	often	been	seen	as	
preferring	li	to	fa	in	its	approach	to	regulating	social	interactions.	The	radical	differ-
ence	between	China	and	the	West	where	law	is	concerned	has	become	an	orthodoxy	
since	 Montesquieu’s	 description	 of	 China	 as	 “a	 despotic	 state	 whose	 principle	 is	
fear”	highlighted	a	“property	peculiar	to	the	government	of	China,”	which	“confused	
religion,	laws,	mores,	and	manners”;	China	was	well	governed	only	when	a	way	was	
found	to	make	li	be	observed	exactly.6	This	orthodoxy	has	also	been	borne	out	in	the	
works	of	Chinese	scholars,	such	as	the	sociologist	Fei	Xiaotong,	whose	fieldwork	in	
Chinese	villages	during	the	1930s	and	1940s	reveals	a	“society	without	litigation.”	
Chinese	 villagers	 thought	 of	 a	 “songshi	訟師,	 a	 litigation	monger,”	 as	 “a	 trouble-
maker,”	as	“someone	who	creates	social	discord.”7	According	to	Fei,	rural	society	in	
China	was	ruled	by	li	and	not	by	laws	in	the	sense	of	“regulations	maintained	by	state	
power.”8	Li	provide	both	guidance	for	behavior	and	rules	by	which	Chinese	com-
munities	 resolved	 conflicts	 through	 mediation	 by	 their	 elders.	 Recent	 writings	 on	
Chinese	law	by	Western	scholars	still	refer	to	a	“sometimes	ambivalent	attitude	that	
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Chinese	 popular	 culture	 maintained	 towards	 the	 likelihood	 that	 justice	 could	 be	
achieved	through	resort	to	formal	state	sanctioned	legal	institutions	and	practices.”9
One	could	 trace	 the	philosophical	 inspiration	 for	Fei’s	“society	without	 litiga-
tion”	and	the	“rule	of	ritual”	to	the	Analects:
The	Master	said,	“Guide	them	by	edicts,	keep	them	in	line	with	punishments,	and	the	
common	people	will	stay	out	of	trouble	but	will	have	no	sense	of	shame.	Guide	them	by	
virtue,	keep	them	in	line	with	the	rites	[li],	and	they	will,	besides	having	a	sense	of	shame,	
reform	themselves.”	(Analects	2.3)
Other	texts,	such	as	the	Zuozhuan	左傳	and	Liji	禮記	(Book	of	rites),	also	mention	li	
as	a	tool	of	virtuous	government.10	In	contrast,	penal	codes	in	Chinese	society	were	
seen	as	responses	to	disorder	resulting	from	the	decline	of	virtuous	rule.	The	chapter	
on	Lü	Xing	呂刑	(“The	Prince	of	Leu	on	punishments”)	in	the	Shangshu	尚書	(Book	
of	documents)	contrasts	the	Chinese	use	of	moral	influence	(de	德)	with	the	use	of	
punishments	to	restrain	a	“barbarian”	people,	the	Miao.11	The	Zuozhuan	tells	of	how,	
in	the	sixth	year	of	Duke	Zhao’s	rule,	the	state	of	Zheng,	under	the	able	minister	Zi	
Chan,	had	similarly	cast	 tripods	with	a	code	of	punishments	on	 them.	This	act	of	
promulgation	 in	 the	 sixth	 century	 b.c.e.	was	 criticized	as	 incompatible	with	 good	
government	in	terms	that	Confucians	would	agree	with:
When	the	people	know	what	the	exact	laws	are,	they	do	not	stand	in	awe	of	their	supe-
riors.	They	also	come	to	have	a	contentious	spirit,	and	make	their	appeal	to	the	express	
words,	hoping	to	be	successful	in	their	argument.	They	can	no	longer	be	managed.	.	.	.	
When	once	the	people	know	the	grounds	for	contention,	they	will	cast	propriety	[li	禮]	
away,	and	make	their	appeal	to	your	descriptions.	They	will	all	be	contending	about	a	
matter	as	small	as	the	point	of	an	awl	or	a	knife.	Disorderly	litigations	will	multiply,	and	
bribes	will	walk	abroad.12
In	the	narrative	above,	the	term	fa	was	not	actually	mentioned;	“When	people	
know	what	 the	exact	 laws	are”	 translates	min zhi you pi	民知有辟.	However,	 the	
term	fa	is	explicitly	employed	in	the	narrative	of	the	twenty-ninth	year	of	Duke	Zhao,	
which	attributes	to	Confucius	the	following	remarks	about	the	casting	of	tripods	in-
scribed	with	penal	statutes	by	the	state	of	Jin:	“[it	is	presumed]	to	make	these	articles	
with	the	penal	statutes,	 to	form	the	laws	of	the	State.	This	is	giving	an	example	of	
lawlessness”	 (shanzuo xing qi yiwei guofa shi fa jian ye	擅作刑器以為國法是法姦
也).13
In	Confucian	political	philosophy,	it	is	more	important	to	have	virtuous	people	in	
government	than	to	have	a	good	system	of	laws.	While	every	aspect	of	life	is	to	be	
guided	by	li,	which	exemplifies	the	appropriate	forms	of	all	civilized	behavior,	in-
cluding	but	not	limited	to	ethical	behavior,	laws	are	at	best	necessary	evils.	At	their	
worst,	laws	undermine	efforts	at	achieving	a	polity	of	virtuous	people.	Critics	of	Con-
fucianism,	who	usually	understand	it	in	terms	of	the	state	ideology	of	imperial	China,	
often	blame	Confucians’	negative	attitude	toward	laws	for	the	longevity	of	despotism,	
the	difficulty	of	establishing	the	rule	of	law,	and	the	lack	of	respect	for	human	rights	
in	China.	While	some	observers	find	direct	and	indirect	evidence	of	a	move	toward	
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rule	of	 law	 in	China,	critics	worry	 that	 this	product	of	Western	society	cannot	be	
transplanted	 to	China,	 and	 attempts	 to	do	 so	will	 only	disrupt	 the	 existing	 social	
o	rder.14	Even	if	there	is	a	generally	more	negative	attitude	toward	law,	its	develop-
ment	in	China	is	complex	and	cannot	simply	be	blamed	on	Confucian	philosophy.	
We	should	question	if	the	objections	to	publicizing	penal	codes	and	the	criticism	of	
a	government’s	use	of	punishment	in	early	Confucian	texts	amounted	to	a	rejection	
of	law	per	se.
William	 Alford	 contends	 that	 those	 who	 accept	 at	 face	 value	 the	 Confucian	
worldview	 of	 government	 as	 effecting	 social	 order	 through	 moral	 transformation	
rather	than	legal	restraint	tend	to	underestimate	the	role	of	law	throughout	Chinese	
history.15	 Other	 scholars,	 including	 Robin	Yates,	 Karen	Turner,	 Melissa	 Macauley,	
Kathryn	Bernhardt,	and	Philip	Huang,	have	begun	to	fill	this	gap	in	our	understand-
ing	of	China.16	Passages	from	early	texts,	such	as	the	Shangshu	and	the	Zuozhuan,	
mention	various	penal	codes,	including	one	of	the	Xia	dynasty.	Some	contemporary	
Chinese	scholars	trace	the	origin	of	Chinese	laws	to	the	times	of	the	legendary	sage-
kings	Yao	and	Shun.	Since	 the	1980s,	new	archaeological	 finds	have	generated	a	
spate	of	discussions	in	Chinese	scholarly	journals	regarding	the	existence	and	nature	
of	 a	 legal	 system	 during	 the	 Shang	 and	 Zhou	 dynasties.17	Although	 Derk	 Bodde	
maintained	that	“the	written	law	of	pre-modern	China	was	overwhelmingly	penal	in	
emphasis,”	others	contend	that	early	Chinese	laws	were	not	restricted	to	penal	codes,	
even	if	there	is	insufficient	evidence	to	believe	that	China	had	a	comprehensive	civil	
law	system	from	very	early	times.18	According	to	Geoffrey	McCormack,	administra-
tive	laws	were	well	developed	by	the	Qin	dynasty	(221–206	b.c.e.).19
There	 is	 no	 conclusive	 evidence	 of	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 criminal	 and	
civil	law,	the	former	involving	punishments	and	penalties	—	loss	of	freedom,	property,	
and	life	—	and	the	latter	involving	directives	for	the	losing	party	to	compensate	the	
winning	party	for	injuries	suffered.20	The	existence	of	criminal	laws	is	presupposed	
by	the	Confucian	view	that,	even	if	necessary,	punishments	are	inferior	instruments	
of	 government,	 and	a	good	government	 that	 cares	 about	 social	harmony	and	 the	
people’s	virtues	and	welfare	should	aim	to	minimize	its	own	use	of	such	negative	
instruments.	The	 reference	 to	 not	 differing	 from	 others	 in	 hearing	 litigations	 even	
though	the	ideal	is	to	make	litigations	unnecessary	(Analects	12.13)	might	presup-
pose	the	existence	of	civil	law	as	well,	but	“litigation”	(song)	during	this	early	period	
could	also	mean	a	formal	practice	of	bringing	civil	disputes	for	judgment	by	r	espected	
persons	in	the	community,	without	necessarily	applying	any	codified	civil	law,	which	
might	be	a	latter	development.21
Some	attribute	the	Confucian	dislike	for	laws	to	the	fact	that	the	law	had	been	
used	primarily	as	an	arbitrary	instrument	in	the	hands	of	despotic	rulers.22	The	long	
absence	of	democracy	in	China	means	that	we	should	not	expect	the	same	kind	of	
respect	for	law	as	recommended	in	democratic	societies,	where	the	law	has	different	
origins	and	functions	vis-à-vis	 the	people.	 In	the	historical	rivalry	between	Confu-
cianism	and	Legalism	(fajia	法家),	Legalists	are	traditionally	seen	as	advocating	the	
use	of	law	as	a	tool	of	“government	of	the	ruler,	by	the	ruler,	for	the	ruler.”23	In	texts	
such	as	the	Shangjunshu	商君書	and	the	Hanfeizi	韓非子,	 fa	法	comprises	clearly	
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formulated,	widely	promulgated,	and	uniformly	applied	rules	of	behavior	 that	 the	
people	must	conform	to;	obedience	brings	rewards,	and	transgressions	harsh	punish-
ments.24	Imperial	China	owed	most	of	its	state	machinery	to	the	Legalists,	who	gained	
power	under	Qin	rule.	Authoritarian	politics	did	not	allow	the	people	to	use	the	laws	
for	their	own	protection,	especially	against	the	ruling	class.	Confucian	concern	for	
the	people’s	welfare,	not	surprisingly,	then	led	them	to	condemn	what	had	turned	out	
to	be	a	tool	of	oppression.	Most	of	those	who	accept	an	opposition	between	fa	and	
li	operate	with	John	Austin’s	famous	definition	of	law	(equated	with	fa)	as	a	sover-
eign’s	command	made	obligatory	by	the	threat	of	punishment	for	violation.	This	is	
only	one	among	many	different	theories	about	what	the	law	is,	and	one	which	has	
been	strongly	criticized	and,	if	Dewey	himself	is	to	be	believed,	was	already	well	on	
its	way	to	obsolescence	by	the	1940s	(L7	:	120).25
Although	it	is	not	clear	whether	fa,	if	understood	as	laws,	would	include	civil	law	
in	pre-Qin	China,	we	could	still	consider	whether	the	Confucian	disapproval	of	pun-
ishments	and	penal	codes	might	not	extend	 to	modern	civil	 law,	which	does	not	
i	nvolve	punishment	(if	we	set	aside	the	complication	of	punitive	damages).	The	direc-
tives	to	compensate	the	winning	party	for	injuries	suffered	might	be	voluntarily	com-
plied	with	once	a	verdict	is	reached	without	any	need	for	coercion,	and	oppression	
by	government	is	not	an	issue.	However,	this	voluntary	compliance	does	not	mean	
that	the	threat	of	coercion	is	absent;	the	directives	could	be	coercively	enforced	if	
they	are	ignored.	The	Confucian	concern	that	coercion	would	result	only	in	external	
compliance	without	moral	transformation	would	still	be	valid	in	such	cases.	More-
over,	the	need	to	bring	a	civil	suit	to	court	indicates	a	failure	in	social	harmony,	a	lack	
of	virtue	 in	one	or	more	of	 the	parties	 involved,	of	which	Confucians	would	also	
disapprove.	There	is	also	the	danger	that	the	civil	suit	would	result	in	even	more	ac-
rimony	and	hostility,	which	would	further	damage	social	relations.
There	is	evidence	that	the	Chinese	did	not	treat	fa	as	merely	a	tool	of	oppressive	
government	even	in	the	pre-Qin	period.	Confucians	often	cite	the	fa	of	ancient	kings	
to	criticize	the	existing	practices	of	rulers.26	Chad	Hansen	argues	that	Legalist	fa	is	
anti-bureaucracy	rather	than	anti-people.27	The	Legalist	Shang	Yang’s	insistence	on	
meting	out	punishment	when	the	crown	prince	of	Qin	broke	a	law	is	in	the	direction	
of	 turning	 laws	 into	 tools	 that	could	be	wielded	against,	as	well	as	 for,	 the	 ruling	
class.28	Though	not	commonly	practiced,	the	Chinese,	including	many	Confucians	
over	the	centuries,	have	had	the	ideal	that	when	the	“son	of	heaven”	breaks	a	law,	he	
should	be	punished	in	the	same	way	as	the	common	people.	In	the	seventeenth	cen-
tury,	the	Confucian	Huang	Zongxi,	contrary	to	the	earlier	Confucian	view,	asserted	
that	only	if	there	is	“rule	by	law”	(fazhi)	can	there	be	“rule	by	men”	(renzhi).	He	used	
the	“higher	law”	of	the	early	kings	cited	by	Confucius	and	Mencius	to	criticize	posi-
tive	dynastic	laws	and	conceived	of	the	former	fa	as	higher	than	the	state	or	ruler.29	
Randall	Peerenboom	argues	that	the	Huang-lao	thought	of	the	pre-Qin	and	Han	pe-
riods	subscribes	to	a	natural-law	theory	that	sees	a	necessary	relationship	between	
law	and	morality.30	If	laws	were	not	always	perceived	as	immoral	or	at	best	amoral	
instruments	of	arbitrary	despotic	rule,	then	fa	and	li	in	early	Chinese	politics	may	not	
have	been	as	far	apart	as	some	Confucians	believe.
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Those	wishing	to	reduce	the	distance	between	li	禮	and	fa 法	often	point	out	that	
early	Chinese	texts	oppose	li	with	xing	刑	or	xingfa	刑罰,	punishments	and	penalties,	
or	penal	codes,	and	not	fa.	Modern	Mandarin	translates	law	as	fa	or	falü	法律,	but	in	
the	pre-Qin	period,	it	may	be	misleading	to	view	Chinese	fa	法	through	the	Western	
modern	concept	of	law.31	According	to	Herrlee	Creel,	during	the	Zhou	and	Warring	
States	periods,	fa	had	a	whole	range	of	related	meanings:	“model,”	“method,”	“tech-
nique,”	“rule,”	“regulation,”	and	“law.”32	In	early	Chinese	texts	such	as	the	Analects,	
fa	is	better	translated	as	“model”	or	“standard”	(Analects	9.24,	20.1).	D.	C.	Lau	uses	
“standard”	(and	similar	terms)	more	than	“law”	(only	in	4A1	and	6B15)	in	translating	
fa	in	the	Mencius.	John	Knoblock	translates	fa	sometimes	as	“standard”	and	some-
times	as	“law”	in	the	Xunzi.33	This	mixture	of	meanings	is	common	to	many	texts	of	
the	Warring	States	period	or	earlier.	Which	meaning	 is	dominant	 in	a	 text	varies.	
Scholars	generally	consider	“law”	an	appropriate	translation	of	fa	in	the	Shangjunshu	
and	the	Hanfeizi.	Creel	insisted	that	Shen	Buhai	was	not	a	Legalist	because	fa	did	not	
mean	“law”	for	Shen.
Scholars	such	as	Benjamin	Schwartz,	Angus	Graham,	and	Roger	Ames	believe	
that	the	meaning	of	fa	changed	during	the	Warring	States	period,	and	by	the	time	of	
Xun	Zi	and	Han	Fei,	just	before	the	Qin	unification,	fa	came	to	duplicate	xing.34	Ac-
cording	to	this	view,	the	later	meaning	of	fa	as	laws	is	restricted	to	penal	codes	coer-
cively	imposed	at	the	ruler’s	whim.	By	the	Han	dynasty,	this	reduction	of	fa	to	xing	
seems	 fairly	established;	 the	Han	 lexicon,	Shuowen jiezi	說文解字,	explains	 fa	 in	
terms	of	xing.	The	Duan	commentary,	instead	of	treating	this	as	a	reduction	from	a	
broader	meaning,	 treats	xing	 as	 the	primary	meaning	of	 fa,	which	had	been	“ex-
tended	to	mean	all	models.”35	However,	Chad	Hansen	argues	against	the	meaning-
change	thesis	and	maintains	that	fa	means	not	“laws”	but	“objective	standards”	even	
for	 the	Legalists.	Not	until	 it	was	used	to	 translate	“dharma”	when	Buddhism	was	
introduced	to	China,	a	century	after	the	rise	of	Legalism,	did	fa	come	to	mean	“law,”	
in	the	sense	of	“universal	propositions	(sentences)	with	either	descriptive	or	prescrip-
tive	necessity	(causation	or	obligation).”	Hansen	maintains	that,	before	then,	China	
did	not	have	a	concept	of	law.36
The	earliest	and	widest	meaning	of	fa	probably	includes	standards	of	measures,	
standards	of	language	use	and	interpretation,	and	norms	or	models	that	need	not	be	
articulated	as	propositions.	Among	these	are	li,	which	were	norms	of	behavior,	tradi-
tionally	believed	to	be	established	by	sage-kings	but	which	more	probably	emerged	
from	practices	socially	sanctioned	over	time,	as	well	as	codified	prescriptive	rules	
imposed	by	rulers	on	subjects	and	coercively	enforced,	which	could	be	identified	as	
laws.	Both	provide	“standards”	of	what	to	do	and	the	consequences	of	various	ac-
tions	in	specific	circumstances.	I	believe	that	this	accounts	for	the	overlaps	between	
fa	and	li	as	well	as	between	fa	and	xing.
Li as Laws
Different	relationships	between	li	and	fa	could	be	inferred	from	different	chapters	in	
the	Xunzi.	 Instead	of	one	encompassing	 the	other,	 the	 two	may	be	on	par	as	 two	
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major	kinds	of	human	“artifice”	(wei	偽).	To	deal	with	bad	nature	in	human	beings,	
the	sage,	“having	created	ritual	principles	and	moral	duty	(li-yi	禮義),	institutes	the	
regulations	of	laws	and	standards	(fa-du	法度).”37	Insofar	as	fa	can	be	translated	as	
laws,	some	Chinese	scholars	have	argued	that	in	the	Xunzi,	li	forms	the	moral	basis	
of	fa,	indicating	a	moralistic	view	of	laws.38	However,	the	close	association	between	
li	and	fa	in	the	Xunzi	leads	others	to	view	Xun	Zi	as	more	Legalist	than	Confucian;	to	
them,	what	Xun	Zi	calls	li,	which	can	rectify	the	person	and	the	state,	is	the	same	as	
what	the	Legalists	call	fa.39	Chinese	legal	scholar	Mei	Zhong	Xie	considers	it	a	unique	
characteristic	of	ancient	China	that	it	had	“directive	and	preventive”	laws,	which	are	
known	as	li,	in	contrast	to	corrective	and	suppressive	laws	known	as	xing.40	Roberto	
Unger	sees	li	as	“customary	or	interactional	law,”	even	though	li	were	“tacit	models	
of	exemplary	conduct”	 that	are	either	unformulated	or	 formulated	as	moral	anec-
dotes,	and	therefore	different	from	fa,	which	possesses	the	defining	qualities	of	bu-
reaucratic	 or	 regulatory	 law	 in	 being	 positive	 and	 public.41	 Criticizing	 Unger’s	
description	of	 li	 as	 “not	 rules	at	all,”	Alford	maintains	 that	 li	 comprises	 “specific,	
public	rules.”	Manuals	of	 li,	such	as	 the	Zhouli	周禮	and	the	Yili	儀禮,	existed	as	
early	as	the	fourth	and	third	centuries	b.c.e.42	Confucius	lamented	the	lack	of	records	
of	rites	of	earlier	dynasties,	which	implies	 that	 li	could	be	written	down	(Analects	
3.9).	However,	the	records	Confucius	was	lamenting	need	not	be	formulated	as	rules	
and	could	have	been	a	record	of	moral	anecdotes.	Later,	 li	 formulated	as	rules	of	
behavior	 were	 written	 into	 the	 dynastic	 statutes.	 Ch’ü	T’ung-tsu’s	 study	 of	 “tradi-
tional	Chinese	law”	(from	the	Han	dynasty	to	the	Qing	dynasty)	is	as	much	about	li	
as	it	is	about	fa.43
Ainsworth	 sees	 li	 and	 fa	 as	 “two	 competing	 normative	 legal	 concepts.”	This	
“communicates	 something	 significant	 about	 the	 imperial	Chinese	 legal	 sensibility	
that	sought	to	incorporate”	both	Confucian	and	Legalist	views	about	human	nature	
and	normative	order.	To	Ainsworth,	li	are	“prescriptive	social	rules”	even	though	they	
are	“unwritten	and	lacking	in	details.”44	Besides	legal	scholars,	sinologists	and	phi-
losophers	also	often	conceive	of	li,	whether	written	or	unwritten,	as	rules	of	behavior	
aiming	at	social	harmony.	Wm.	Theodore	de	Bary	maintains	that	“there	was	a	con-
siderable	overlap	in	 the	conceptions	of	 ‘rites’	and	‘laws’	 in	Confucian	usage”	and	
considers	li	“a	basic	constitutional	order.”45	Both	are	about	“corporate	or	systemic	
models”	that	are	required	to	realize	personal	virtue	in	government;	the	difference	lies	
only	in	li	working	through	voluntary	self-restraint,	while	laws	employ	external	incen-
tives	or	disincentives.	Even	this	difference	disappeared	when	it	became	a	common	
practice	to	punish	transgressors	of	li.	However,	viewing	li	as	a	legal	concept	does	not	
mean	minimizing	the	differences	between	traditional	Chinese	society	and	Western	
societies,	as	the	failure	to	develop	civil	society	in	China	discussed	in	de	Bary’s	work	
was	due	at	least	in	part	to	the	inadequacy	of	the	ritual	form	of	“basic	constitutional	
order”	in	restraining	the	despotic	power	of	the	emperor.46
The	Confucian	 tendency	 to	 treat	 li	as	 imposing	moral	constraints	on	statutory	
laws	led	to	views,	such	as	Joseph	Needham’s,	 that	 li —	which	were	believed	to	be	
created	by	sages	based	on	human	nature	and	cosmic	order	—	were	the	equivalent	of	
natural	laws	in	Western	thought.47	According	to	Dewey,	the	natural-law	tradition	in	
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the	West,	which	referred	to	an	ultimate	source	that	is	supposedly	higher	and	more	
fixed	 than	experience	and	 therefore	a	 suitable	 “ground	 for	 genuinely	philosophic	
evaluation	of	law”	(L14	:	116),	is	an	attempt	at	justification	and/or	criticism	of	existing	
rules	and	practice.	As	a	pragmatist,	Dewey	rejected	such	attempts	and	treated	law	as	
“through	and	through	a	social	phenomenon”	(L14	:	117).48	However,	Dewey	did	not	
have	to	worry	about	the	arbitrary	will	of	the	monarch;	he	was	concerned	with	how	
well	the	law,	as	a	relatively	permanent	institution	enacted	by	democratic	communi-
ties,	could	track	the	dynamic	desires	and	interests	of	the	people	as	it	should.	What	is	
obsolete	for	Dewey	—	an	appeal	to	a	higher,	nonhuman	authority	to	criticize	de	facto	
human	authorities	—	might	have	necessitated	some	kind	of	functional	equivalent	to	
natural	laws	in	the	undemocratic	Chinese	context.
Dewey’s	 general	 concept	of	 law	 is	 “a	 statement	or	 relation	of	order	which	 is	
employed	as	an	effective	method	of	procedure	in	further	dealings	with	phenomena”	
(M7.269).	Laws	dealing	with	activities	of	human	beings	in	relation	to	one	another,	
that	is,	laws	in	the	jural	sense,	were	the	first	to	emerge	into	conscious	recognition;	
“natural	 law”	 was	 conceived	 “after	 the	 analogy	 of	 jural	 law”	 (ibid.).	 Dewey	 also	
criticized	the	Austinian	theory	of	law,	even	though	it	locates	the	source	of	law	within	
social	activities	and	relations,	for	failing	to	give	a	persuasive	or	coherent	account	of	
the	role	played	by	custom	(E4	:	81–89).	Dewey	maintained	that	the	development	of	
law	as	an	institution	began	with	rules	that	were	first	imposed	in	the	form	of	customs,	
which	makes	customs	 the	 source	of	 law	 (E4	:	40;	 L14	:	118).	On	one	occasion,	he	
actually	asserted	that	“all	laws	except	those	which	regulate	technical	procedures	are	
registrations	of	existing	social	customs	and	their	attendant	moral	habits	and	p	urposes”	
(L5	:	73).	 However,	 on	 other	 occasions,	 Dewey	 maintained	 a	 distinction	 between	
custom	and	law,	insisting	that	when	a	custom	becomes	a	law,	it	gains	a	new	status.	
Customs	become	laws	only	when	authoritatively	formulated	and	stated	by	a	compe-
tent	authority	(L3	:	327).	It	was	noted	earlier	that	Dewey’s	“customs,”	if	not	exactly	
equivalent	to	li,	are	akin	to	or	at	least	overlap	with	them.	The	trend	of	writing	many	
ritual	rules	into	the	dynastic	statutes,	beginning	at	least	with	the	Han	dynasty,	might	
then	parallel	Dewey’s	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	customs	and	laws.49	
However,	I	propose	that	we	would	arrive	at	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	
relationship	between	customs,	 li,	and	law	by	focusing	on	how	they	work	on	indi-
viduals	who	comply	with	them,	and	thereby	achieve	social	order.
To	Dewey,	customs	arose	from	the	need	to	shape	and	control	 the	behavior	of	
members	in	a	social	group;	they	are	social	norms	embodying	the	group’s	judgment	
that	certain	rules	are	to	be	followed	for	the	sake	of	the	group’s	welfare.	Transgression	
is	met	with	 the	group’s	disapproval	and	sometimes	by	punishment;	 the	young	are	
trained	to	observe	the	rules	so	that	they	become	social	habits	(M5	:	54–55).	“A	cus-
tom	is	thus	a	norm	of	voluntary	action.	It	is	intermediate	between	morality,	properly	
speaking,	and	law	—	akin	to	morals	in	having	at	disposal	a	subjective	disposition	in	
the	individual	to	conform,	and	akin	to	law	in	using	objective	means	of	compulsion”	
(L3	:	16).	Using	this	spectrum	between	the	use	of	objective	means	of	compulsion	and	
the	subjective	disposition	to	conform,	law	overlaps	with	customs	in	using	objective	
means	 of	 compulsion,	 while	 Confucian	 li	 overlaps	 with	 customs	 in	 requiring	 the	
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subjective	 disposition	 to	 conform.	When	 li	 descends	 to	 using	objective	means	of	
compulsion,	it	degenerates	from	ethical	ideal	or	virtue	to	custom	or	even	law.	Law	
could	be	obeyed	without	 the	use	of	objective	means	of	compulsion	because	 it	 is	
rooted	in	or	has	engendered	a	corresponding	custom,	and	if	the	practice	becomes	
more	than	about	external	compliance,	bringing	about	moral	transformation	of	char-
acter	and	social	harmony,	it	ascends	to	the	ethical	ideal	of	li.
Confucian and Pragmatic Tools of Government
In	Dewey’s	view,	“Politics	and	law	are	closely	tied	together;	they	cannot	ultimately	
be	severed”	(M15	:	105).	Dewey	maintains	that,	as	statements	or	relations	of	order	
between	events	or	actions,	“laws	are	the	general	methods	by	which	we	introduce	
continuity	and	order	in	experiences	otherwise	discrepant	and	mixed	up.	.	.	.	[T]hey	
are	instrumentalities	of	reducing	seeming	conflicts	to	harmony”	(M4	:	199).	By	stating	
clearly	the	relation	between	certain	actions	and	specific	consequences,	and	promis-
ing	that	the	courts	of	the	land	will	ensure	that	the	stated	relation	between	the	two	will	
obtain,	laws	introduce	predictability	into	social	life.	Laws	“are	in	fact	the	institution	
of	conditions	under	which	persons	make	their	arrangements	with	one	another.	They	
are	structures	which	canalize	action”	(L2	:	269).	By	setting	out	and	making	predict-
able	the	relations	between	specific	conditions/actions	and	their	consequences,	law	
helps	to	regulate	social	interaction,	where	there	is	potential	for	conflict.	Dewey	sug-
gested	that	the	occasion	for	a	custom	to	become	law	by	being	authoritatively	formu-
lated	by	a	competent	authority	is	always	a	dispute	(L3	:	327).	For	example,	the	custom	
of	only	the	eldest	son	inheriting	might	have	existed	in	a	society	but	became	law	in	
the	common-law	tradition,	when	some	conflict	that	arose	over	a	particular	case	(per-
haps	the	other	siblings	insisted	that	their	father	had	wanted	all	to	have	a	share)	was	
brought	before	a	magistrate	who	ruled	in	favor	of	the	customary	inheritance	rights	of	
the	eldest	son.	In	other	legal	traditions,	some	different	process	of	legislation	by	the	
appropriate	institution	might	be	required	before	a	law	came	into	being,	but	the	trig-
ger	for	legislation	in	such	cases	would	be	some	dispute	over	preexisting	customs.	It	
should	be	noted	that	Dewey’s	observation	does	not	preclude	that	laws	could	also	
have	their	source	in	the	resolution	of	certain	conflicts	even	when	no	custom	exists.
The	law	is	a	tool	of	government	because	of	its	function	in	preventing	and	resolv-
ing	conflicts.	By	clearly	delineating	boundaries	of	permissible	behavior	in	specific	
circumstances,	 laws	enable	people	to	avoid	conflicts,	and	when	they	do	arise,	re-
solve	them	according	to	principles	known	to	and	accepted	by	the	community.	By	
determining	what	is	right	in	each	case,	the	law	makes	it	possible	for	people	not	to	
settle	conflicts	through	arbitrary	might.	In	Dewey’s	view,	“law	is	the	sole	alternative	
to	resort	to	force,	individual	and	collective,	as	a	method	for	arranging	disputes	due	to	
conflict	of	interests”	(M15	:	107).	We	should	probably	read	“force”	in	the	quoted	pas-
sage	from	Dewey	as	“violence,”	the	wasteful	and	destructive	use	of	force,	to	render	
it	consistent	with	other	statements	recognizing	the	use	of	force	to	enforce	laws.	There	
is	some	evidence	for	this	reading	of	Dewey’s	conception	of	law:	“law	is	essentially	a	
formulation	of	 the	use	of	 force”	(M10	:	251);	 it	describes	“a	method	for	employing	
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force	economically,	efficiently,	so	as	to	get	results	with	the	least	waste”	(M10	:	212).	
Dewey	seems	to	move	from	a	conception	of	law	involving	what	H.L.A.	Hart	calls	
“rules	 of	 recognition,”	 secondary	 rules	 setting	 out	 the	 criteria	 of	 legal	 validity	—	
“customs	 do	 not	 become	 law	 in	 any	 juridical	 sense	 until	 they	 are	 authoritatively	
stated	or	 formulated”	 (L3	:	327)	—	to	one	closer	 to	 the	conception	of	 law	 found	 in	
	German	 thought,	which	 views	 coercion	 as	 a	 necessary	part	 of	 law.50	Whether	 or	
not	coercion	is	included	in	its	definition,	the	ability	of	law	to	settle	disputes,	when	
other	means	such	as	negotiation	fail,	is	nevertheless	due	to	the	presence	of	a	coercive	
element.
From	 a	 Confucian	perspective,	 li	 are	 also	 “structures	which	 canalize	 action,”	
which	introduce	continuity	and	order	into	experience,	and	predictability	and	stabil-
ity	into	social	life,	and	prevent	and	resolve	conflicts.	However,	both	treating	China	as	
“a	society	without	litigation”	at	one	extreme	and	reducing	li	to	a	form	of	laws	at	the	
other	extreme	oversimplify	the	issues	and	distort	the	understanding	of	actual	experi-
ence.	Li	and	laws	are	not	related	as	moral	ideal	to	the	practice	of	realpolitik.	They	
have	coexisted	in	actual	practice,	and	both	legal	and	ritual	practices	have	fallen	short	
of	their	respective	ideals.	As	ideas,	law	and	li	overlap	and	share	certain	similarities,	
but	they	also	differ	significantly	in	their	functioning	vis-à-vis	the	goal	of	good	govern-
ment.	All	governments,	East	or	West,	need	to	contend	with	the	problem	of	conflicts	
arising	from	differences	in	beliefs,	desires,	needs,	and	interests,	and	attempt	to	serve	
the	common	good	with	limited	resources.	How	could	something	common	be	c	reated	
from	differences?	How	do	we	coordinate	different	pursuits	to	avoid	or	resolve	harm-
ful	conflicts?	By	offering	different	answers	to	these	questions,	law	and	li	serve	as	dif-
ferent	kinds	of	tools	of	government.
Li	and	law	are	complementary	rather	than	mutually	exclusive	alternatives	even	
in	the	Confucian	worldview.	Both	build	social	consensus	and	facilitate	social	coordi-
nation	and	cooperation	by	establishing	and	maintaining	social	norms.	Whether	we	
rub	noses	or	bow	to	each	other,	sharing	a	common	ritual	norm	of	greeting	ensures	
that	an	encounter	begins	on	a	positive	note,	increasing	the	chances	of	harmonious	
and	mutually	satisfying	interaction.	Whether	we	drive	on	the	right	or	on	the	left,	fol-
lowing	the	norms	of	a	single	set	of	traffic	laws	together	ensures	that	we	do	not	kill	
each	other	simply	for	lack	of	coordination.	Confucians	recognize	both	laws	and	li	as	
tools	of	government	because	both	could	be	employed	to	elicit	certain	kinds	of	behav-
ior	and	prevent	others,	but	assess	their	desirability	differently.	One	may	either	com-
ply	with	a	norm	of	behavior	voluntarily	as	per	ritual	practice	or	be	ordered	to	do	so	
by	the	authorities	as	the	result	of	an	aggrieved	party	bringing	the	dispute	to	the	rele-
vant	officials.	The	latter	indicates	a	failure	of	virtuous	self-regulation	and	cooperation	
on	the	part	of	those	concerned.	Confucians	prefer	that	people	regulate	themselves	
through	virtue	so	that	government	authorities	need	not	resort	to	force.
Confucians	believe	that	while	the	effect	on	behavior	in	the	short	term	may	be	the	
same,	different	tools	of	government	have	diverging	results	in	the	longer	run.	Those	
who	obey	laws	“will	stay	out	of	trouble,	but	will	have	no	sense	of	shame,”	whereas	
those	who	follow	rituals	“will,	besides	having	a	sense	of	shame,	reform	themselves”	
(Analects	2.3).	Whether	criminal	or	civil,	laws,	by	judging	actions	and	dealing	with	
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disputes	according	to	public	rules,	will	direct	people’s	attention	to	winning	the	ad-
versarial	contests	before	the	adjudicating	authorities,	even	at	the	expense	of	moral	
considerations	of	the	situation.	Apart	from	encouraging	the	kind	of	morally	suspect	
verbal	glibness	(ning	佞)	that	Confucius	disapproved	of,	the	tendency	to	separate	law	
from	morality	means	that	using	the	law	as	the	primary	tool	of	government	(let	alone	
the	only	tool)	may	lead	to	the	kind	of	society	where	even	social	and	political	leaders	
publicly	excuse	or	justify	their	acts	in	terms	of	“What	I	did	was	immoral,	but	it	was	
not	illegal.”51	Moreover,	given	that	there	is	usually	a	winner	and	a	loser	in	litigations,	
an	increase	in	litigiousness	is	likely	to	reduce	the	overall	harmony	of	a	community.	
Indeed,	resorting	to	litigation	is	in	itself	a	failure	in	harmony	since	it	means	that	the	
parties	could	not	voluntarily	come	to	a	mutual	agreement.
Confucians	see	the	social	norms	of	li,	unlike	statutory	laws,	as	inherently	ethical,	
which	sets	them	apart	from	mere	convention.	Li	embody	virtues	and	realize	harmony	
in	the	community.	As	an	idea,	Confucian	li	eschew	coercion.	Dewey’s	Ethics	con-
ceives	of	ritual	in	terms	of	noncoercive	custom	embodying	social	if	not	moral	con-
sensus.	Dewey	recognizes	that	 it	 is	not	 force	that	brings	about	consensus,	but	 the	
existence	of	consensus	that	enables	laws	or	customs	to	be	enforced.	The	context	for	
Dewey’s	emphasis	on	consensus	is	Dewey’s	social	conception	of	self	as	a	critique	of	
America’s	rugged	individualism.	This	brings	Dewey’s	understanding	of	the	value	of	
customs	and	rituals	closer	to	that	of	Confucian	li,	which	imply	a	relational	concept	
of	self,	and	as	a	virtue	bring	the	value	of	harmony	to	social	interaction.	However,	li	
have	a	higher	ethical	status	in	Confucianism	compared	with	customs	and	rituals	in	
Dewey’s	Ethics.	From	the	Confucian	perspective,	when	both	elicit	voluntary	compli-
ance	and	embody	consensus,	li	still	differ	from	customs	in	introducing	the	possibility	
of	excellence	or	virtue	into	a	practice.
The	issue	of	coercion	is	central	to	the	Confucian	preference	for	li	over	laws.	By	
resorting	to	punishment	or	threat	of	force,	the	reasons	offered	by	laws	for	action	are	
external;	they	make	a	particular	act	more	or	less	attractive	by	manipulating	the	exter-
nal	 preconditions	 or	 consequences.	 Once	 the	 laws	 are	 removed	 or	 if	 a	 person	
b	elieves	 she	 could	 avoid	 these	 external	 deterrents,	 she	will	 return	 to	 her	 original	
preference.	In	this	way,	laws	work	only	as	long	as	there	is	effective	enforcement.	In	
contrast,	li	work	through	habituation	that	results	in	spontaneous	compliance	based	
on	emotive-cognitive	transformation.	It	is	this	transformation	internalizing	the	e	thical-
social	norm	that	develops	a	sense	of	shame	in	a	person.	One	reforms	oneself	through	
li	so	that,	even	if	no	one	is	watching	or	no	one	would	know	if	one	transgresses,	one	
would	still	follow	the	ritual	norms.52
How	valid	is	this	Confucian	contrast	between	laws	and	li ?	The	claim	that	laws	
always	coerce	or	threaten	and	never	educate	or	reform	those	who	obey	seems	too	
sweeping.	Han	Fei	mentioned	“using	laws	to	rectify	the	mind,”	intending	that	laws	
bring	about	changes	in	those	who	obey	them,	going	beyond	external	compliance.53	
One	might	start	obeying	a	law	to	avoid	penalties,	but	if	the	norm	gives	satisfaction,	it	
could	very	well	bring	about	 the	kind	of	 transformation	Confucians	associate	only	
with	 li.	 For	example,	by	 repeatedly	obeying	a	 law	against	 littering,	a	person	may	
develop	a	habit	of	not	littering	as	well	as	come	to	appreciate	the	consequently	clean	
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environment	so	much	that	she	voluntarily	will	not	litter	even	in	a	country	without	
such	a	law.54	Conversely,	compliance	with	ritual	norms	may	also	be	due	to	external	
factors,	such	as	a	fear	of	disapproval	or	a	desire	for	praise	from	those	around	us;	it	is	
because	external	factors	could	also	play	a	part	in	eliciting	ritual	behavior	that	his-
torically	li	came	to	be	enforced	through	coercive	means	in	China.	Even	if	no	such	
external	factors	are	involved,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	habituation	will	develop	a	
sense	of	 shame	 rather	 than	 result	 in	blind	and	mechanical	 following	of	 the	 ritual	
norms	that	will	maintain	order	only	in	fairly	static	conditions.
One	could	argue	that	Confucius	was	quite	aware	of	how	li	could	degenerate	into	
no	 more	 than	 mechanical	 habit	 or	 compliance	 for	 external	 reasons,	 and	 that	 he	
would	rather	have	people	ignore	li	than	follow	them	only	for	form’s	sake	or	for	the	
wrong	 reasons.	His	 rhetorical	question,	 “Are	 rites	no	more	 than	gifts	 of	 jade	and	
silk?”	is	an	implied	criticism	of	the	mechanical	following	of	ritual	forms	that	already	
must	have	been	a	problem	during	his	time	(Analects	17.11).	He	told	Zai	Wo	to	ignore	
the	three-year	ritual	mourning	period	if	“[you	would]	be	able	to	enjoy	eating	your	
rice	and	wearing	your	finery”	against	the	ritual	norms	(Analects	17.21),	although	to	
other	students	he	criticized	Zai	Wo’s	lack	of	feeling,	making	it	clear	that	li	is	ethi-
cally	important	even	though	it	defeats	the	purpose	to	force	people	to	conform.	Per-
formances	that	are	forced,	mechanical,	or	done	for	some	external	reasons	are	not	
exemplary	 li	and	are	meaningless.	Unless	 the	performance	comes	 from	the	heart-
mind,	with	the	recognition	that	something	is	the	appropriate	thing	to	do,	and	more-
over	 is	 an	embodiment	of	 excellence	 to	which	one	commits	one’s	 entire	person,	
there	is	no	Confucian	li.
Although	it	might	overlap	with	Dewey’s	concept	of	custom,	the	Confucian	con-
cept	of	li	is	not	merely	about	customary	morality,	which	Dewey	contrasts	with	reflec-
tive	morality.	In	reflective	morality,	customs	are	still	present,	but	“the	individual	has	
to	grasp	the	meaning	of	these	customs	over	and	above	the	bare	fact	of	their	existence,	
and	has	to	guide	himself	by	their	meaning	and	not	by	the	mere	fact	noted”	(M5	:	167).	
Adequate	performance	of	Confucian	 li	must	rise	to	the	level	of	reflective	morality,	
even	though	over-intellectualizing	will	get	in	the	way	of	effective	practice.	The	Con-
fucian	li	is	closely	related	to	yi	義,	understood	as	what	is	meaningful	or	appropriate.	
According	to	the	Book of Rites,	“li	is	the	actualization	of	yi.	If	an	observance	stands	
the	test	of	being	judged	by	what	is	yi,	even	though	the	ancient	kings	may	not	have	
done	it,	it	should	be	adopted	for	its	yi.”55	Grasping	and	embodying	the	meaning	and	
not	mere	compliance	with	observed	forms	is	critical	to	effective	ritual	performance.	
Performances	of	Confucian	li	are	subject	to	evaluation,	by	the	criterion	of	yi,	or	what	
is	appropriate	to	a	situation;	this	introduces	a	critical	reflective	element	to	li	that	is	
important	to	any	effort	 to	reform	 li	 to	meet	changing	social	and	historical	circum-
stances.
The	idea	of	li	in	Confucianism	does	not	merely	describe	customary	mores;	it	is	
associated	with	“leading	the	people	with	de	德	(excellence	or	virtue)”	(Analects	2.3).	
For	Confucians,	good	government	is	a	government	of	virtue;	such	a	government	must	
achieve	more	than	social	order	based	only	on	prudential	actions	elicited	by	threats	
or	incentives.	It	must	bring	about	social	harmony	based	on	ethical	transformation	of	
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the	people	into	virtuous	ritual	participants.	Where	actual	practices	are	concerned,	
whether	we	apply	the	term	law	or	 li,	what	is	important	is	to	identify	what	kind	of	
social	norms	are	at	work	and	how	they	work,	so	that	we	may	determine	whether	they	
will	bring	about	the	kind	of	social	harmony	Confucian	good	government	aims	for.
What	should	governments	do	before	that	ideal	of	harmonious	ritual	community	
is	achieved?	Voluntary	compliance	is	undoubtedly	superior	to	coerced	obedience,	
but	until	the	ethical	transformation	of	the	entire	populace	is	complete,	threats	and	
incentives	remain	necessary.	Governments	must	deal	with	the	problems	of	an	imper-
fect	society	here	and	now,	rather	than	act	as	if	they	are	already	living	in	a	utopia	of	
virtue.	This	recognition	is	also	present	in	the	Analects,	wherein	one	of	the	purposes	
of	Confucius’	“rectification	of	names”	 (zhengming)	 is	 to	ensure	 that	“punishments	
will	fit	the	crimes”	so	that	“the	people	will	know	where	to	put	hand	and	foot”	(Ana-
lects	13.3).	It	becomes	much	more	pronounced	in	the	Xunzi,	which	advocates	that	
“those	 who	 come	 forward	 with	 good	 intentions	 should	 be	 treated	 with	 full	 ritual	
courtesy;	those	who	come	forward	without	good	intentions	should	be	handled	with	
punishments”	(Xunzi	9.2).	A	flourishing,	well-governed	state	must	get	both	punish-
ments	and	penalties	(xingfa	刑罰)	and	rituals	and	music	(liyue	禮樂)	right,	implying	
that	they	are	complementary.	In	practical	terms,	rituals	do	not	offer	a	complete	alter-
native	to	laws	as	the	tool	of	government;	they	are	both	needed,	together	with	other	
means,	such	as	education	and	non-official	agencies	that	resolve	disputes	and	con-
tribute	to	social	order.	Neither	is	law	alone	sufficient	for	good	government.	The	“rule	
by	law”	that	Confucians	must	reject	is	a	vision	of	government	that	focuses	only	on	
the	minimal	requirement	of	eliciting	external	compliance	and	ignores	completely	the	
quest	for	social	order	that	is	not	maintained	by	coercive	threats	and	incentives.
Deweyan Democracy and the Art of Community
Dewey	believed	that	Chinese	empires	were	so	“interwoven	with	local	customs	as	to	
be	part	of	the	established	order	of	nature	and	able	to	dispense	with	military	support”	
(M11	:	219).	This	resulted,	in	China,	in	“a	scheme	of	remarkable	static	equilibrium	—	
the	most	stable	known	to	history”	(M11	:	219).	In	the	nineteenth	century,	this	equilib-
rium	was	disrupted	by	external	forces,	and	what	had	once	been	a	strength	became	a	
weakness.56	 Entrenched	 customs	 prevented	 intelligent	 solutions	 to	 new	 problems	
(M11	:	213).	For	customs	 lack	adaptability,	and	 those	whose	 lives	are	governed	by	
customs	tend	to	dislike	change.	Even	in	civilized	societies,	custom	“has	the	greatest	
inertia”	and	tends	to	persist	even	through	social	revolutions	that	dismantle	the	visible	
structures	of	institutions	(M14	:	76–77).	In	contrast,	laws	pragmatically	understood	as	
serving	a	social	function	“assure	the	introduction	on	a	large	scale	of	the	rational	fac-
tor	into	concrete	evaluations	of	legal	arrangements”	(L14	:	122).	Pragmatic	laws	are	
amenable	to,	 indeed	demand,	social	 inquiry	and	intelligent	change	to	ensure	that	
they	live	up	to	their	function.
Dewey	seems	to	imply	that	custom	on	its	own	is	an	inferior	tool	compared	with	
law	(which	implies	custom)	because	the	former	is	not	amenable	to	intelligent	change.	
Noting	that	some	appeal	to	reason	as	the	“fount	and	origin”	of	laws,	Dewey	himself	
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considers	law	to	be	“embodied	reason”	in	the	sense	of	“a	formulated	generalization	
of	means	and	procedures	in	behavior	which	are	adapted	to	secure	what	is	wanted”	
(L2	:	271).57	 Formulation,	 application,	 and	 critique	of	 laws	 as	 prescriptive	 rules	 or	
universal	propositions	all	require	what	is	commonly	recognized	as	reason.	To	be	ir-
rational	or	unreasonable	would	render	a	law	seriously	flawed	if	not	totally	disqualify	
a	proposition	from	being	a	 law.	 Insofar	as	deliberate,	controlled	social	change	re-
quires	the	use	of	reason	(broadly	construed),	the	Confucian	li	also	needs	the	use	of	
reason	if	it	is	to	be	amenable	to	reform	and	conscious	improvement.	For	example,	
when	later	Confucians	such	as	Zhu	Xi	formulated	“family	rituals,”	probably	on	the	
basis	of	previous	practices,	reason	is	involved	in	reflective	selection	and	m	odification.	
This	does	not	contradict	the	fact	that	ritual	performances	are	not	primarily	exercises	
in	reasoning,	but	embodied	experiences	better	understood	as	aesthetic,	concerned	
with	perception,	appreciation,	and	enjoyment.58	Analects	8.8	associates	li	with	arts	
such	as	poetry	and	music:	“Be	stimulated	by	the	Odes,	take	your	stand	on	the	rites	
and	be	perfected	by	music.”	The	Book of Rites	has	chapters	on	music,	and	on	li	and	
music,	which	are	often	mentioned	together	as	liyue	in	early	Chinese	texts.	The	asso-
ciation	of	li	with	music	also	implies	the	importance	of	enjoyment	in	ritual	practice,	
as	the	same	character	樂	is	used	for	both	music	and	joy,	a	fact	that	Xun	Zi’s	discus-
sion	of	music	made	much	of.59	Robert	Eno	captures	the	centrality	of	 the	aesthetic	
dimension	in	Confucian	(ru	儒)	ritual	mastery	most	aptly	by	describing	the	Ruists	as	
“masters	of	dance.”60
The	 aesthetic	 emphasis	 of	 li	 may	 be	 obscured	 or	 deliberately	 suppressed	 by	
viewing	it	as	a	rigid	set	of	prescriptive	rules	of	behavior	imposed	from	above	in	order	
to	entrench	hierarchical	class	distinctions.	Only	a	small	minority	agrees	with	Hansen	
that	the	ancient	Chinese	thinkers	“never	characterized	the	li	禮	as	rules,	as	oughts,	or	
as	prescriptive	sentences.”61	The	latter	legalization	of	Confucianism	overshadows	the	
origin	of	li	as	customary	practices	wherein,	“far	from	universally	applicable	princi-
ples,	 they	 are	 particular	 mores,	 values	 and	 guidelines	 for	 human	 interaction	 of	 a	
particular	 society	at	a	particular	 time.”62	The	Chinese	 tradition	does	not	offer	any	
detailed	account	of	the	origin	of	rituals	that	matches	the	Pragmatists’	account	of	the	
connection	between	personal	habits	and	social	customs,	and	how	these	emerge	in	
the	process	of	individuals	interacting	to	bring	order	to	their	lives,	simplifying	prac-
tices,	 and	 preparing	 the	 way	 for	 evaluating	 habits	 and	 customs.63	 In	 general,	 the	
Chinese	 traditional	discourse	on	 li	 paid	more	attention	 to	 intentional	 “top-down”	
propagation	 and	 training	 to	 observe	 the	 rituals	 properly	 than	 to	 the	 spontaneous	
emergence	of	rituals	as	personal	aesthetic	practices.	The	Analects	considers	the	insti-
tution	of	li	the	province	of	the	“son	of	heaven”	(Analects	16.2).	The	treatise	on	li	in	
the	Xunzi	(chapter	19)	and	other	early	Chinese	texts	attributed	them	to	the	legendary	
sage-kings.
Traditional	accounts	notwithstanding,	the	concept	of	Confucian	li	could	be	re-
constructed	to	better	appreciate	its	aesthetic	element,	which	is	crucial	to	its	capacity	
to	bring	about	harmony.	A	ritual	performance	should	be	a	dynamic	process	of	“nour-
ishing	the	emotions”	(Xunzi	19.1d),	conveying	the	fitting	emotions	and	meanings	in	
social	 interactions.	The	rules	of	 li	are	elicited	 from	exemplary	performances.	They	
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emerge	out	of	an	aesthetic	process	and	should	be	treated	as	secondary	rather	than	
definitive.	They	may	guide	the	beginner,	but	the	ritual	virtuoso	has	no	need	for	them.	
The	rules	may	attempt	to	articulate	the	ritual	forms,	but	to	reduce	li	to	rules	is	to	mis-
take	the	sacrificial	vessel	for	the	actual	sacrifice.	How	inadequate	the	rule-	conception	
of	rites	is	may	be	seen	by	how	little	importance	the	Analects	attaches	to	the	tangible	
forms,	that	part	of	rites	which	could	be	formulated	as	enforceable	“rules	of	behavior”:
The	Master	said,	“Surely	when	one	says	‘The	rites,	the	rites,’	it	is	not	enough	merely	to	
mean	presents	of	jade	and	silk.	Surely	when	one	says	‘Music,	music,’	it	is	not	enough	to	
mean	bells	and	drums.”	(Analects	17.11)
Confucian	li	are	performances	wherein	the	particular	is	more	the	focus	than	the	uni-
versal;	quality	and	content	in	a	unique	performance	outweigh	form	and	technique	in	
importance.	Observing	all	the	correct	ritual	forms	is	worthless	if	reverence	is	missing	
from	the	performance	(Analects	3.26):	“In	mourning,	it	is	better	to	err	on	the	side	of	
grief	than	on	the	side	of	formality”	(Analects	3.4).	In	Confucianism,	li	embody	the	
ways	of	living	harmoniously	together.	Governing	through	li	is	to	conduct	politics	as	
the	art	of	making	community.
Studying	the	way	Confucian	li	work	could	illuminate	the	aesthetic	side	of	p	olitical	
life	and	enhance	our	understanding	of	how	to	achieve	Deweyan	democracy	as	a	way	
of	 life.	Studying	how	laws	could	promote	democratic	 life	and	how	they	could	be	
continuously	reformed	to	meet	the	people’s	changing	needs	yields	clues	for	democ-
ratizing	 Confucian	 rituals	 through	 social	 inquiry	 and	 reflection.	The	 contrast	 and	
complementarity	of	li	as	primarily	aesthetic	and	laws	as	primarily	rational	give	us	a	
clue	to	how	to	introduce	flexibility	and	responsiveness	into	the	task	of	government.	
As	with	all	pragmatic	contrasts,	this	should	not	be	reified	into	a	dualism.	It	must	be	
stressed	that	Dewey	believed	that	reason	requires	the	guidance	of	feeling	(the	aes-
thetic	 apprehension	of	 quality),	 and	 feeling	 requires	 continual	 reflective	 (rational)	
scrutiny.64	Part	of	appreciating	the	contrast	and	complementarity	of	li	and	laws	is	to	
realize	that	the	aesthetic	emphasis	of	one	does	not	preclude	the	use	of	reason,	and	
the	rational	emphasis	of	the	other	should	not	neglect	the	aesthetic.	The	success	of	
reforming	 laws	 to	meet	 the	needs	and	desires	of	 individuals	and	communities	 re-
quires	 the	keen	“aesthetic	apprehension	of	quality”	mentioned	above	as	much	as	
rigorous	 reasoning.	While	 the	 aesthetic	 is	 emphasized	 in	 particular	 performances	
themselves,	that	li	could	be	formulated	and	evaluated	indicates	the	applicability	of	
reason	to	a	needed	process	of	improvement	as	human	communities	and	individuals	
change.
Dewey	himself	understood	the	task	of	achieving	democracy	as	both	art	and	sci-
ence;	he	 refused	 to	separate	 the	 rational	and	 the	aesthetic,	although	 the	aesthetic	
element	 in	Dewey’s	political	philosophy	has	been	 relatively	neglected.65	The	 ten-
dency	to	emphasize	one	at	the	expense	of	the	other	—	and,	worse,	to	oppose	them	in	
a	dualism	—	is	the	cause	of	many	social	problems.	To	be	more	than	a	political	system,	
more	than	the	“political	democracy”	that	Dewey	found	“the	least	inspiring,”	democ-
racy	as	“the	idea	of	community	life	itself”	(L2	:	328)	must	avoid	a	reified	separation	of	
the	rational	and	the	aesthetic,	and	achieve	a	balance	between	them.	The	rational	and	
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the	aesthetic,	science	and	art,	are	inseparable	in	bringing	“an	organized,	articulate	
public”	into	being:
The	highest	and	most	difficult	kind	of	inquiry	and	a	subtle,	delicate,	vivid	and	responsive	
art	of	communication	must	take	possession	of	the	physical	machinery	of	transmission	and	
circulation	and	breathe	life	into	it	 .	.	.	 for	democracy	is	 the	name	for	a	life	of	 free	and	
enriching	communion.	 It	had	 its	 seer	 in	Walt	Whitman.	 It	will	have	 its	consummation	
when	free	social	inquiry	is	indissolubly	wedded	to	the	art	of	free	and	moving	communica-
tion.	(L2	:	350)
Democracy	as	a	way	of	life	is	guided	by	democracy	as	a	regulative	idea	(L2	:	328);	its	
meaning	has	to	be	envisioned	imaginatively	and	emotionally,	as	well	as	understood	
conceptually	and	analyzed	rationally;	 its	 functioning	must	be	 investigated	empiri-
cally.	Achieving	the	democratic	way	of	life	is	at	the	same	time	an	art	and	a	science.	
In	Nature and Experience,	Dewey	points	out
[that]	 science	 is	 an	art,	 that	 art	 is	practice[,]	 .	.	.	 that	 art	—	the	mode	of	activity	 that	 is	
charged	 with	 meanings	 capable	 of	 immediately	 enjoyed	 possession	—	is	 the	 complete	
culmination	of	nature,	and	that	“science”	is	properly	a	handmaiden	that	conducts	events	
to	this	happy	issue.	(L1	:	268–269)
In	Thomas	Alexander’s	view,	“The	art	of	life	is	the	goal	behind	Dewey’s	ethics,	
his	philosophy	of	democracy,	and	his	theory	of	education.”	Furthermore,	the	key	to	
this	art	of	life	is	to	develop	a	“creative-critical	culture,”	a	culture	understood	as	“that	
organized	 body	 of	 activities	 by	 which	 human	 beings	 are	 meaningfully	 present	 to	
each	other”	and	“a	culture	that	is	consciously	aware	of	itself	as	a	shaping	and	shape-
able	power.”66	According	to	Dewey,
The	problem	of	freedom	and	democratic	institutions	is	tied	up	with	what	kind	of	culture	
exists.	.	.	.	The	struggle	for	democracy	has	to	be	maintained	on	as	many	fronts	as	culture	
has	aspects:	political,	economic,	international,	educational,	scientific	and	artistic,	[and]	
religious.	(L13	:	186)
This	cultural	approach	to	the	pursuit	of	democracy	indicates	the	area	of	most	fertile	
engagement	between	Dewey’s	philosophy	and	Confucianism.	Li	constitute	an	im-
portant	part	of	culture:	they	are	norms	of	excellence	selected	through	the	experience	
of	a	community	from	what	Dewey	calls	“the	habitudes	which	lie	below	the	level	of	
reflection	.	.	.	which	have	been	formed	in	the	constant	give	and	take	of	our	relation-
ship	with	others”	(M9	:	22).	While	reasoning	is	required	to	solve	problems	in	social	
inquiry,	li	shape	the	tacit	environment,	which	has	an	impact	on	how	we	participate	
in	the	inquiry	and	the	outcome.67
In	an	aesthetic	experience,	we	move	from	a	precognitive,	inchoate	feeling	of	a	
situation	to	a	cognitive,	communicative,	process	of	understanding	its	meaning	and	
value	in	the	wider,	continuous	context	of	shared	experience,	and	return	to	an	appre-
ciation	of	the	whole,	a	sense	—	which	is	a	fusion	of	feeling	and	thinking	—	of	its	mean-
ing	and	value	as	immediately	embodied	in	the	situation.	According	to	Dewey,	“all	
communication	is	like	art,”	and	communication	is	central	to	the	building	of	com-
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munity	as	democratic	processes	(M9	:	9).	Reasoning	in	social	inquiry	is	instrumental	
in	 solving	 the	problems	of	 the	general	public	 in	a	democracy.	However,	 thinking	
alone	does	not	determine	the	outcome;	the	attitudes	and	feelings	that	participants	
bring	to	the	inquiry	also	affect	the	results.	If	one	enters	an	inquiry	feeling	hostile	to-
ward	fellow	participants,	obstinately	believing	that	one	alone	is	right	and	entitled	to	
what	one	wants,	differences	of	opinion	are	unlikely	 to	be	 resolved	 to	 the	mutual	
benefit	of	all.	The	effect	of	rituals	on	emotions,	especially	the	emphasis	of	Confucian	
li	on	respect	and	deference	or	“yielding	to	others,”	means	that	they	could	be	useful	
in	guiding	social	inquiry	in	the	direction	of	social	harmony.
To	appreciate	how	li	could	be	an	important	complement	to	laws	in	government,	
we	should	recognize	them	as	“tacit	models	of	exemplary	conduct”	without	reducing	
them	to	“customary	or	interactional	law.”	Confucians	believe	that	acting	and	govern-
ing	appropriately	cannot	be	achieved	by	merely	applying	universal	rules	in	an	exer-
cise	of	reason;	they	also	require	aesthetic	sensitivity	to	the	unique	circumstances	of	
each	particular	situation.	Rather	than	rules	that	anyone	could	comprehend,	authori-
tative	performances	of	li	by	exemplary	individuals	provide	the	standards	of	behavior.	
This	is	why	a	Confucian	government	of	li	also	asserts	rule	by	virtuous	persons	over	
rule	by	law	alone.	However,	it	is	important	to	remember	that	de	facto	governments	
are	not	necessarily	the	people	who	should	rule.	As	long	as	we	do	not	have	the	most	
virtuous	in	government,	then	laws	can	be	very	useful	in	constraining	such	imperfect	
government.	Just	as	laws	have	to	be	applied	to	subjects	who	are	not	virtuous	enough	
to	 follow	 good	 examples,	 governments	 who	 are	 not	 virtuous	 enough	 to	 govern	
through	li	should	be	curbed	by	laws	as	well.	Besides	recognizing	that	li	and	laws	are	
more	complementary	than	mutually	exclusive	alternatives	in	currently	possible	gov-
ernment,	we	must	also	realize	that	there	cannot	be	an	absolute	rule	as	to	which	is	the	
more	appropriate	in	a	particular	situation;	ultimately	it	is	a	matter	of	judgment	requir-
ing	humanity	and	wisdom.
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u	ndergone	several	major	revisions.	I	thank	Leigh	Jenko	and	the	anonymous	r	eviewers	
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